Lebanon's Tragedy and Greater Global Significance

Lebanon's tragedy continues to bear fruit, not just locally in Lebanon, but also in greater portions of the Middle East. Syria is certainly in trouble - through decades of short-sighted involvement in Lebanon, it has managed to alienate enough of any possible support base here that the only individuals it could get to do its bidding in any provisional government were a group of stooges simply unqualified and incapable of handling a crisis. Sure enough, the mixture of arrogance and sheer befuddlement expressed by Lebanon's prime minister, interior minister, justice minister, and information minister immediately after Hariri's assassination basically eliminated any chance that this government could bestow any sense of confidence upon itself or claim any credit for providing any kind of leadership whatsoever. Their combination of defensive question-avoiding and counter-arguments as well as the occasional emotional outburst on television has led at least this writer to conclude that they were set up to fail from the beginning. They were never qualified to lead a nation, they were incapable of providing moral or even tactical leadership, and they quite simply failed at both. It was as if, to entertain the tired old prejudices readily available here, they were lacking clear instructions from the boss about how to proceed.

As Lee Smith and others have mentioned, Syria's primary soft spot exists within its Sunni majority. The Sunnis represent a relative minority in Lebanon, but they are economically powerful and can still leverage a significant of power when they need to. That power is to be found outside of Lebanon - in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has few restrictions against its economic and ideological involvement here in Lebanon, but it has been stymied in Syria repeatedly. A statement from what remains of the Muslim Brotherhood provided (see comment at end) some measure of evidence that there exists a current of thought within Syria that indicates that it's time for greater Sunni - read Saudi - involvement there. To see the government here falling all over itself while the Christian-Druze opposition revitalizes itself with a sudden and dramatic infusion of Sunni sentiment, it is easy to see that Lebanon's problem has already internationalized itself, perhaps to the point of no return for Syria.

Syria's problem is that it now has no friends left - President George W. Bush's statement yesterday provided exactly what Saddam Hussein never had to hear: that Europe and the U.S. were not divided on a crucial issue in the Middle East. Second, the assassination of Hariri - who held Saudi citizenship, so there exists a pretext for Saudi Arabia to consider his assassination as a message to its own government - has the potential to drive not just Saudi government interest, but also Sunni sentiment, firmly into the Euro-American camp regarding Syria. Well, one could probably argue that this is the lesson to be learned from leading in a region by sowing chaos and instability - all that bad feeling can come back to isolate you in the long-term.

Nothing could please Saudi Arabia more than the prospect of being able to take a few jabs at Syria, and the prospect appears even more likely now. Stratfor now reports via Time magazine that the U.S. is now holding back-channel talks with Iraqi insurgents:

All parties are eager to backpedal from the reports, but we regard them as true -- not only because reports of such conversations have reached us for months, but because under the current circumstances, these discussions make complete sense. It also makes complete sense that Ahmed Chalabi, who is trying to resurrect himself as the leader of the Shiite government, would say publicly that the new government would not be bound by these discussions.
Everything, inside and outside Iraq, is pivoting around what the Sunnis will do -- and that, in turn, pivots around what the Americans, not the new government, are prepared to offer.

It does not even matter at this point whether the story is true or not. As Syria has effectively encouraged the insurgency in Iraq, such a prospect must strike Syria's soft spot in a way that nothing else can. To amplify on this point, let's consider how this insurgency has functioned. As Stratfor and others have pointed out since late 2003, this insurgency has existed in the form of autonomous cells with only loose affiliations, flexible leadership structure, and almost non-existent communication between them. Additionally, the insurgents have proven to be adept at monitoring local popular sentiment and particularly savvy at monitoring the world's media outlets for indications of international public opinion. As I have argued before, defeating such an insurgency is extremely difficult to do using military means. This is the point at which the U.S. can certainly take advantage of the inherent weakenesses of this insurgency - so what does one do with an enemy that does not talk much with each other and yet watches satellite TV and reads the world's newspapers? Start a rumor, that's what. Certainly, if the U.S. were conducting secret negotiations with the intent of creating a tactical advantage for itself, it would never share that information with the media. If it were trying to threaten the insurgents, though - and thereby divide them against each other - then it may well be the best strategy available. For the U.S.' strategy to be effective it need not necessarily be true that it is negotiating with the insurgents, but only that the insurgents believe that some of their numbers are indeed selling out. If they believe that they are being divided against each other, it could sow confusion in their ranks, and all the implications thereof - such as purges within their ranks, other insurgents jumping ship, etc. So this is where we come back to Syria - that Syria could have been fanning the flames of an insurgency that now may become divided against itself is probably the worst of all possible situations, because they will be forced to reckon with a monster they helped create but now cannot control. And the specter of possible Saudi involvement? Don't even ask.

Stratfor's analysis adds that all roads lead to Iran. This is difficult to prove, of course, but Iran has not taken any steps to demonstrate otherwise. First, Stratfor notes that the insurgency indeed does, or at least did, enjoy widespread popular support:

In order to operate on the scale seen before the January election, the insurgents had to have active support at the village and neighborhood levels. In Iraq, that support is available only if the leadership is prepared to give it. The Sunni leadership was prepared to give it. Now the discussion is whether and under what terms that leadership is prepared to withdraw the support, leaving the insurrection to degrade for lack of resources. Indeed, the capture of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's propagandist indicates the inner security blanket around al-Zarqawi might have been breached. If this is so, it would be because of shifts among Sunnis.
The Sunni leadership rose against the coalition invasion of Iraq for three reasons:

1. The initial American policy -- to completely purge anyone involved with the Baathist regime -- was, in effect, a purge of Sunnis from the regime.
2. The Sunnis saw the American relationship with the Shia and Iran -- as symbolized by the role of Chalabi -- as well as with the Kurds, as direct evidence that the United States intended to crush the Sunni leadership and community.
3. Given the first two reasons, supporting the follow-on war plan of the Baathist government seemed the prudent thing to do. In large part, the American will was untested, and there was hope that a massive rising -- potentially joined by elements in the Shiite community -- would cause the United States, if not to withdraw, then to reconsider its administrative policy in Iraq.

The willingness of the U.S. to hedge its bets between Shi'a and Sunni leadership in Iraq ultimately has led Iran to question the efficacy of its position in Iraq, and whether the emerging government would indeed become pro-Iranian. Here, Stratfor seems to believe that Iran did the hit on Hariri, and it did it as a message to the United States regarding the lengths to which it will go in the region in order to get its way, as well as an indication of the resources it has available:

The United States does not want Iraq to be dominated by Iran. First, U.S. forces would lose their base in the region. Second, the Iranians would then be the dominant regional power. Nothing would stand between the Iranian military and the entire Persian Gulf except for U.S. forces. The last thing Washington wants is to tie down its already stretched military in a blocking operation against Iran.

From Washington's standpoint, the best solution is not the destruction of Sunni forces by the Shia; the best outcome would be a change of policy on the part of the Sunni leadership, allowing them to join the Iraqi government with their forces officially disbanded but truthfully intact. The Sunnis might be a minority, but they are strategically located. The Shia can hold Baghdad in a coalition government with the Sunnis, but if the Sunnis rise up, the center can't hold. Unless the Shia want to split Iraq, they cannot refuse an accommodation with the Sunnis. Unless the Sunnis want to become the victims of the Shia, they cannot refuse accommodation either. Deals have been built on less.

There is another player out there that is vitally interested in the outcome: Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were deeply traumatized by the rise of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his Shiite regime. The fear of a powerful Iran, dominating Iraq, is Riyadh's primal fear. The Saudis helped to underwrite Iraq's war with Iran precisely because, though they were scared of Saddam Hussein, they were terrified of Khomeini.

A Shiite-governed Iraq is a nightmare for Riyadh because it creates two possible scenarios. In one, the Iranians move through Iraq and invade the Saudi oil fields, moving as far south as they wish, supported by Shia living in the region. In the other, the United States comes to Riyadh's aid and stations divisions in Saudi Arabia -- thus resurrecting the nightmare that led to the radicalization of the Wahhabi clerics and the rise of al Qaeda. Either outcome stinks.

Therefore, it is in the kingdom's best interest to prevent a purely Shiite Iraqi government or the collapse of Iraq into three countries, with the southern route to the western shore of the Persian Gulf in the hands of the Shia. In fact, this is not merely "the best interest" of the Saudis -- it is a burning issue. We can even extend this a little more broadly. If one divide is between Shiite and Sunni, the other is between Arab and Iranian. Arab Shia occupy a special position, of course, but the Sunni Arab world does not want to see Iran emerge as a regional superpower.
Riyadh holds one of the keys to the situation. Among the foundations of the Sunni insurrection has been the sense that the struggle is joined to a broader Arab interest. Buttressed by Saudi money and recruits, this has been an important dimension of the insurgency. It also has given the Saudis influence among the insurgents. Saudi religious leaders have links to al-Zarqawi. Riyadh has been surprisingly successful in coping with Saudi Arabia's own militant insurrection by co-opting its leadership, particularly the religious leaders. The Saudis have the means to whittle away at the insurrection in Iraq and the motive to do so: Less than anyone do they want to see an Iraqi government simply in the hands of the Shia.

That is why Shiite figure Chalabi, still singing Iran's tune, recently insisted the new government would not be bound by any negotiation with the Sunnis. It also is the reason that, as improbable as it might appear, Chalabi seems to have a chance at being prime minister of Iraq, or at least a major figure in the government. In recent days, there has been a media blitz aimed at rehabilitating him by portraying him as a secular technocrat. That he might be, but he also is adopting a line on the Sunni guerrillas that, if followed, works directly against American and Saudi interests and toward Iranian interests.

It is interesting to observe how over the past two years, American and Saudi interests have converged and American and Iranian interests have diverged. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Iranians should have reached out to the Syrians over the past few weeks, trying to forge a strategic alliance.

The Syrians' primary interest is retaining their position of power in Lebanon, just as the primary interest of the Iranians is in building up their position in Iraq. The Americans are systematically whittling away at both of these interests. Tehran has asked for a united front with Syria. Damascus views Iran with suspicion. First, Syrian leaders are not sure what Iran can do for them; second, they are not sure Iran won't negotiate a deal with the Americans, leaving the Syrians wide open. Our guess is that the regime in Syria responded to the Iranians with the demand for a down payment -- some indicator that the Iranians were prepared to cross the Rubicon.

The price we believe they asked was the life of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Hezbollah is an Iranian-founded and -controlled Shiite group that is permitted to operate by Syria. The Syrians wanted al-Hariri out of the way and, if our conjecture is accurate, wanted Tehran to do this via Hezbollah. The Iranians would have accommodated the Syrians -- first, because they needed some international support; and second, because they wanted to throw Hezbollah into the pot. Hezbollah invented suicide bombings and, even more than al Qaeda, it is a global organization. It has grown fat and somewhat complacent in the past decade -- cutting deals in booming Lebanon and elsewhere in a range of businesses -- but the group still knows its craft. And in the al-Hariri affair, Tehran signaled the United States that it has more cards to play than just nuclear weapons.

And so it may appear now that Syria is willing to up the ante even more - the point of playing off Sunnis and Shiites off against each other in the entire region. Such a strategy will ultimately convince the Saudis that they have more in common with the U.S. than they thought, and it may convince the U.S. that enabling Saudi influence (read - money) in Iraq and Lebanon may yield substantial strategic benefits.