Two Speeches, Two Dances

This past weekend saw two separate and very important speeches delivered by key players in the future of Lebanon: Syrian President Bashar al-As'ad and Hizbullah General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah. Both players needed to dance for the cameras and to do it well, for both stand to lose a great deal under a strengthened opposition in Lebanon.

First, it appears that As'ad's position is quite clear, although this is not what he wants others to think; hence his dance before the cameras took on a somewhat contrived and even uncomfortable look. Under pressure from the U.S. and smarting from daily abuse from protesters in downtown Beirut (an experience that until recently an Arab dictator never had to endure), As'ad needed to find a way to break the bad news to his parliament that Syria's occupation of Lebanon will be at least significantly weakened under the current circumstances in order to preserve some shred of hegemony over its smaller neigbor. The reality of Bashar's situation is that he owes his power to his ability to buy off competing interests, and without Lebanon fully in his pocket he simply does not wield enough clout to continue doing this. At the same time, he desperately needed a way to decrease the pressure coming from outside the region, and he needed a way to present the plan in such a manner as not to seem that he undertakes such measures from a position of weakness. So, in his speech he first mentioned that Syria's troop presence had decreased in Lebanon 60 percent (well, not exactly, but that's what he said) since 2000, the year of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. He stated that the troop withdrawal is occurring in line with the Ta'if Accords, and that he fully intends to pull all troops to the Lebanon-Syria border, even as he did not specify when exactly this would happen, or even to which side of the border the troops would ultimately go.

In this case, it is also of some importance what he did not say. He mentioned nothing about the Syrian intelligence presence in Lebanon, in spite of the clear demands of the opposition as well as those of the United States and France for them to pack up and leave along with the troops. He mentioned nothing about the withdrawal of a sizeable contingent of Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2002, less than a year before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. He also mentioned nothing about follow-on redeployments away from Lebanon in February and July of 2003. It is quite easy to argue here that a sizeable portion of Syria's redeployments have occurred as adjustments and realignments made necessary by first, the possibility of a U.S.-Iraq war, and then by fall of the Baathist state in Iraq, not as gestures of goodwill toward Lebanon. So, the way it looks from here is that Bashar is, first of all, trying to sweep the mukhabarat issue under the table; and second, he is trying claim credit for moving troops that were actually part of strategic realignments based on the fall of Saddam. Overall, Bashar's dance gets an A for creativity and artistic merit, and a D-minus for technical proficiency and information integrity.

Nasrallah's dance seemed easier from the outset, as his position sits quite apart from the pressures normally inherent in the lives of state-level actors, but surprisingly his gyrations and flourishes ended up more pronounced than those of As'ad. Nasrallah's performance at his press conference Sunday should have demanded somewhat low expectations, and Nasrallah initially did not disappoint in this regard. First and foremost, Nasrallah simply re-stated Hizbullah's definitive position - that it exists first and foremost as an organ of resistance against the state of Israel, and he went as far as to admonish opposition and government members alike regarding that he had heard so few statements about Lebanon's "true" enemy in this whole process. Nothing shocking there. Indeed, it was somewhat of a stretch for the opposition to court the participation of Hizbullah to begin with, since Syria derives a great deal of utility from Hizbullah's enthusiasm about defending Lebanon's southern border, and the opposition had hinted about returning to the original 1949 armistice that would ultimately close the Lebanese-Israeli front. In short, in this context an enemy of Israel is a friend of Hizbullah's, and the opposition was just not offering enough barbed rhetoric against Syria's Enemy Number One to please the General Secretary. As'ad could relax at this point.

However, Nasrallah knows that Hizbullah sits in a state of political limbo at this point, and its position in Lebanon is not clear politically (for some background, see here, here, and here). Since Israel's withdrawal in 2000, it has had few occasions to create real trouble for the Israeli army, and simultaneously it has made attempts to increase its political visibility. In short, Hizbullah sits at a political crossroads, and the only way forward is to consider how to redefine itself within a Lebanese political framework. Largely, the "Lebanonization" program initiated by Hizbullah's spiritual leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, in which the party adopted as its primary mission the achievement of acceptance within mainstream Lebanese politics, is bearing fruit as we speak. At the same time, however, Hizbullah's pragmatism brings with it questions regarding its possession of weapons and whether it plans eventually to integrate itself into the Lebanese army in order to remove any other discrepancies about its status as an armed movement. Hizbullah has made its position clear on this, and paradoxically so: it will not give up its weapons, it will not join the Lebanese army, and it will continue to augment its level of political participation in the Lebanese state.

So it should come as little surprise that, while Nasrallah rejected the political program of the opposition, he still wants to demonstrate that Hizbullah has something besides violence within its political agenda. This is why he called for a large organized demonstration within close proximity of the opposition protests occurring at Martyrs' Square in Beirut. Nasrallah was clear in his statement about the nature of the protests - they are to be non-violent; no weapons will be permitted; they will fly only the Lebanese flag; and they will be disciplined. The reason for Hizbullah's protest is less than clear initially, but it comes into further focus the closer one looks at the party itself: it will not affiliate itself with a movement that even remotely hints at endorsing peace with Israel (if only for cosmetic purposes, since it has named terms in which it would accept a ceasefire with Israel in the past); it wants to demonstrate that it exists separately and on self-perceived higher ground than the pro-Syria goon-squads that have been causing trouble recently; it wants to highlight its opposition to UNR 1559, since this resolution could be used as a tool by which to endorse an attack on Hizbullah; and finally, it wants to emphasize publicly its support for Syria and its rejection of foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs.

But why the risk? Undoubtedly, a pro-Syria mob chanting anti-Israel and anti-America slogans (which is usually what Hizbullah members do when they are gathered in large numbers), regardless of how disciplined, by its very nature takes on the appearance of a mob intent on doing violence to something. In this context, Nasrallah appears to be heading into territory he does not firmly control - that of the peacemaker. It remains to be seen if his followers will even understand what he was talking about Sunday when he gave his speech - assembling in large numbers, presenting their ability to influence or even to intimidate the opposition protesters just a few hundred meters away, and overall making lots and lots of noise. The temptation to provoke, if Hizbullah's Ashoura demonstrations are any indication, increases exponentially upon the presence of those who may easily be provoked - members of the Lebanese Forces party, for example. Nasrallah has created a huge challenge for himself and for his party in putting forth this demonstration to occur tomorrow. Any hint of violence on the part of his party stands to cost it some support locally, and will greatly strengthen any case made by the U.S. or France that Hizbullah's presence in Lebanon is not in anyone's best interests.

So I ask again, why take the risk? The fact is that Hizbullah feels the heat just like As'ad now. The party's reason for existence may be irreparably damaged if Syria departs completely under the current circumstances. Quite possibly Nasrallah knows that the party will need to consider a future without a Syrian presence to justify the party's utility. If so, local support among an ever-increasing segment of Shiite muslims in Lebanon will not be enough to protect the party from threats from the United States or its allies. Nasrallah knows that now is the time for the party to come into its own and establish a position for itself in which it does not rely completely on Syria. Hizbullah will demonstrate not because it wants to, but because it must.

Therefore, I give Nasrallah a B-plus for creativity and presentation; an A for daring; technical proficiency remains to be seen. The proof comes tomorrow.