Nefarious Intent

If you are looking for updates on the action in Lebanon, you will find the following post unsatisfactory and probably ill-timed. I will not get into the habit of apologizing for this or for anything else, any more than I would apologize for having left Lebanon last year, thinking that something like this may one day happen. The only apology forthcoming from me at all right now is to my wife, and she knows why. But, as always, she understands everything.

While I was away from internet access for the past few days, I had some time to gather some thoughts and, while doing so, I re-read A. Nizar Hamzeh's inevitable classic In the Path of Hizbullah. There are many, many books on Hizbullah now, and most of them get bogged down trying to reveal connections between the party's ideology and certain specific aspects of its behavior – violence, non-compliance with existing order, its relationship with Iran, and so on; mostly the sexy, dramatic stuff that makes headlines. The genius in Hamzeh's book however, is its beautiful simplicity. The party is an ideological one, he tells us, this much is true. And it will never deviate from that ideology. Not ever. And this particular aspect defines and provides structure for all other aspects – to the point that all else is revealed, made somewhat predictable even.

Hamzeh acknowledges that, as Hizbullah was created out of crisis conditions within Lebanon, this is where it thrives best. He tells us that "Hizbullah has a variety of ways to respond to crisis conditions," but operationally its options can be distilled down to two fundamental modes of action:

Hizbullah may apply two modes of operational choices separately or jointly. The militant mode advocates the resort to armed jihad (struggle) as a means to establishing [sic] an Islamic order. Put hypothetically, the more favorable the circumstances – in particular the power equation – the more likely that Hizbullah will resort to militancy and armed struggle to achieve its goals. The gradualist-pragmatist mode, or what might be termed political pragmatism employs nonmilitant means to build an Islamic order. In this mode, Hizbullah operates in some measure within the confines of legality, as defined by the [Lebanese] government. Thus, the less favorable the circumstances, the more likely that Hizbullah will abandon militant tactics in favor of more peaceful methods, such as seeking seats in the legislature or investing in other elected bodies as a way to seize power in the long term. Whatever its operational choice, however, Hizbullah's ultimate goal is the same: to seize political power and establish an Islamic order. (pp. 3-4)

Hizbullah's long-term dissimulation of party objectives in favor of moving into the realm of Lebanese parliamentary politics (especially the systemic need for consensus-building for which the party had no corresponding doctrine) reflected such an operational choice, and their doing so went a long way toward increasing the party's rock-star status within Lebanon. Several well-known academics even went as far as declaring their admiration for the party. Some even projected on to Hizbullah notions that the party might even be that democratic movement not allied with American regional objectives (that independent wind of change!), with only the party's own spurious claims offered as evidence. But Hizbullah knew what it was doing – it let everyone talk, it absorbed the great academic love-fest, and it kept its goals to itself. Quite simply, while many in Lebanon wanted to believe that Hizbullah had evolved toward the concept of Lebanese unity, and many believed that it had indeed changed (especially members of the younger generation who had become infatuated with the party's status as an organ of resistance), Hizbullah had not changed at all. Yes, the party did desire Lebanese unity – under Hizbullah's banner only. No other sort of unity would do.

What ultimately revealed all to the world was Syria's great blunder – the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in early 2005, and Bashar al-Assad's ham-fisted handling of its aftermath. Bashar had been bumbling for months – he had been shouldering increasing criticism since early 2004 as he re-canvassed Lebanese leadership, trying to find the best mix to guarantee Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. He tried to mobilize his supporters in Lebanon, who held a pro-Syria rally in mid-2004, then tried unsuccessfully to silence one of his most vocal critics on his decision to extend the term of President Emile Lahoud. Upon the killing of Hariri, the party held its fire. Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah were counting on Lebanese to blame either al-Qaeda or Israel for their loss; when the criticism turned rapidly against Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian mukhabarat, Hizbullah recognized immediately that one of its sacred flanks would be exposed if it just sat there and let this debate about Syria's continued involvement in Lebanon continue to progress unchecked.

So, Hizbullah organized its March 8, 2005 demonstration opposite the protesters in the downtown area in Beirut. And it was huge – a massive showing of the party's ability to energize its base. Hizbullah had many goals that day, but its most pronounced objective was its attempt to express itself in line with what, at the time, was becoming the primary form of expression in Lebanon – the peaceful demonstration. It needed to prove that it was capable of doing just that. The party also needed to test the palatability of its message on the Lebanese people, quite possibility because Nasrallah felt that it was decision time on its tactics. On March 6 of last year I wrote:

Nasrallah knows that Hizbullah sits in a state of political limbo at this point, and its position in Lebanon is not clear politically (for some background, see here, here, and here). Since Israel's withdrawal in 2000, it has had few occasions to create real trouble for the Israeli army, and simultaneously it has made attempts to increase its political visibility. In short, Hizbullah sits at a political crossroads, and the only way forward is to consider how to redefine itself within a Lebanese political framework. Largely, the "Lebanonization" program initiated by
Hizbullah's spiritual leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, in which the party adopted as its primary mission the achievement of acceptance within mainstream Lebanese politics, is bearing fruit as we speak. At the same time, however, Hizbullah's pragmatism brings with it questions regarding its possession of weapons and whether it plans eventually to integrate itself into the Lebanese army in order to remove any other discrepancies about its status as an armed movement. Hizbullah has made its position clear on this, and paradoxically so: it will not give up its weapons, it will not join the Lebanese army, and it will continue to augment its level of political participation in the Lebanese state.
...
Nasrallah appears to be heading into territory he does not firmly control - that of the peacemaker. It remains to be seen if his followers will even understand what he was talking about Sunday when he gave his speech - assembling in large numbers, presenting their ability to influence or even to intimidate the opposition protesters just a few hundred meters away, and overall making lots and lots of noise. The temptation to provoke, if Hizbullah's Ashoura demonstrations are any indication, increases exponentially upon the presence of those who may easily be provoked - members of the Lebanese Forces party, for
example. Nasrallah has created a huge challenge for himself and for his party in putting forth this demonstration to occur tomorrow. Any hint of violence on the part of his party stands to cost it some support locally, and will greatly strengthen any case made by the U.S. or France that Hizbullah's presence in Lebanon is not in anyone's best interests.

So I ask again, why take the risk? The fact is that Hizbullah feels the heat just like As'ad now. The party's reason for existence may be irreparably damaged if Syria departs completely under the current circumstances. Quite possibly Nasrallah knows that the party will need to consider a future without a Syrian presence to justify the party's utility. If so, local support among an ever-increasing segment of Shiite muslims in Lebanon will not be enough to protect the party from threats from the United States or its allies. Nasrallah knows that now is the time for the party to come into its own and establish a position for itself in which it does not rely completely on Syria. Hizbullah will demonstrate not because it wants to, but because it must.

Considering the context of Hizbullah's March 8, 2005 demonstration as it developed – the deliberate attempt to outnumber the opposition, the primarily Shiite composition of the crowd, and the forceful anti-Israel, anti-opposition rhetoric – Hizbullah demonstrated only that their attempts at non-violence came across as pure, unadulterated blackmail directed at everyone who was not present at their demonstration.

Quite possibly had March 8, 2005 remained as the largest of the demonstrations, we would not see what we are seeing today. But this was not to be. On March 14, 2005, a mere six days later, the factions that brought down the Karami government demonstrated again, this time mobilizing well more than a million people, creating the largest show of populist support ever seen in the Middle East. And Nasrallah was watching.

It was here that Nasrallah determined that working through the Lebanese government would not be the path of least resistance in order to achieve Hizbullah's objectives. It was at this point that the consensual talk ended and Nasrallah ratcheted up the rhetoric about resistance and the right to keep its weapons, made increasing attempts to win allies in the armed Palestinian camps, and allowed the party's military wing to conduct operations in the south against Israeli troops. The party was clearly moving without consulting fully with the Lebanese government. The party's own members of parliament even went as far as to walk out on a parliamentary session in order to consult with their "leadership," a gesture that sent a very clear message to the Lebanese government – you are not our leaders; we do not answer to you.

Finally, the situation as we see it today was not created the day that Hizbullah abducted Israeli troops, nor was it instigated when Hamas beat them to the punch. Rather, this crisis as we see it today originated with Nasrallah saying back in January that Hizbullah would do it. For the party had given up working within the Lebanese government long ago. In March 2005, Hizbullah decided that it would not continue to seek to augment its position through accommodation via the Lebanese government. Rather, it would take over Lebanon the same way the Iranian Revolution took over Iran – by waiting until the state was weakest, shaking it up violently from the inside, picking a fight with a brutal outsider (in Iran's case, with Iraq in 1980), and then sacrificing its own population while simultaneously shoring up its power from within. Hamzeh had it right from the beginning, and this is how we arrive at where we are today. Hizbullah had busied itself for decades trying to break down the core features of the Lebanese state - its multifaceted, consensual, democratic features - and replace them with a facade of stability backed up by raw, ugly militancy. The blasted remains of Lebanon's infrastructure can ultimately be refurbished; a state and a people, once hollowed out by purposeless revolution, cannot.