Pokerface

Are Israeli grunts getting a weekend furlough? If AP's stories are any real indication, IDF operations may take a weekend break and consequent back seat to diplomatic efforts as the U.S., France, and the Arab League seek to break the existing deadlock regarding specifics on what kind of ceasefire to implement in Lebanon.

Stratfor, on the other hand, provides reasonable doubt for this hype:

Israeli troops have moved into Marjayoun -- a Lebanese town about five miles due north of the tip of the Israeli panhandle, where Israeli soldiers had been massed. This move is important, in that what follows will show Israel's intent. From Marjayoun, the troops can move due west along the northern bank of the Litani River, move north into the Bekaa Valley, or do both.

Marjayoun is a mostly-Christian village some 5-6 miles north of the eastern border zone that the IDF entered more than a week ago. Local sources tell me that there is still fierce fighting in the Hizbullah stronghold of al-Khiam and westward, with the IAF pummeling militia strongholds there. Not so with nearby Marjayoun. Stratfor says that the IDF has effectively seized Marjayoun and has been using it as a staging area for follow-on operations. For Stratfor, this indicates a change in strategy. For others who may believe that it was the IDF's intention all along to head into the Bekaa Valley, it does not. Stratfor does agree with such analysts, however, that the IDF has seized the initiative in that they now control the flow of events to come.

[With the seizure of Marjayoun] it would appear that they are returning to a more traditional Israeli model of mobile warfare. It opens the door to envelopment and/or deeper penetration into the Bekaa Valley, which remains Hezbollah's redoubt. It is not at all clear what Israel will do -- and thus, there exists the kind of strategic uncertainty that the Israelis historically
have sought to create in war.

Stratfor focuses on the relative senses of "balance" inherent in the contrasting strategies of the IDF and Hizbullah. Hizbullah's static defense, naturally, remains the most stable and immune to the IDF's development of tactical uncertainty. Defending in depth and numbers is not rocket science (quite literally), and it is hard to fake out fighters holed up in bunkers. However, with the IDF now invading in depth and numbers, compounded by air superiority and massive standoff capability, should Hizbullah need to engage in maneuver (such as rapid reinforcement of strong points, re-supply, etc.) they will probably be cut to pieces, as I suspect some of their efforts have already. Stratfor continues:

Therefore, Israel has now seized the initiative, but it is an initiative against an enemy that cannot respond. Israel can strike here it wants, but it still deals with an enemy that doesn't seem inclined to crumble tactically and that lacks strategic options. Therefore, it is an enemy that really can't be thrown off-balance. The Israelis need to figure out how they can destabilize ezbollah's forces. Hezbollah has to figure out how to remain table. At a certain level, it comes down to morale -- the illingness of the defender to stand and fight where he is. So far, Hezbollah as the morale that is needed.

In previous wars, when Arab armies were mobile, Israel's superior command and control allowed for a degree of razzle azzle that threw the enemy off-balance, but Hezbollah seems to have anchored itself so that its enemy can't do that here.The bottom line in all of this is that Israel has reached a point in which it has strategic options. But in the end, the Israelis will have to go into southern Lebanon and dig out Hezbollah -- and do the same if it moves up into the Bekaa. According to the IDF, 15 Israelis were killed Wednesday, which means that casualties are increasing. Israel is casualty-averse, and that can increase the length of time an operation lasts.

That the IDF remains casualty averse remains contrary to Hizbullah's assumptions. Hizbullah had banked all along on Israel's inability to fight a series of protracted, tough, close-quarters engagements. It is also clear that they relied on two other important intangibles: the Israeli public's lack of stomach for war, and the United States' unwillingness to stand alone in support of Israel. Both assumptions have cost them dearly so far.

Stratfor mentions that currently that the international community is in "disarray." They also mention that the latest American diplomatic announcement criticizing the Israeli security cabinet's decision to expand the ground war has an apparent ring of insincerity, even appearing "pro-forma" and feigning ignorance of the reality that there is indeed a war happening.

I tend to agree, and I would also agree (had Stratfor made this assertion, which they did not), that under these circumstances it makes no sense at all for Israel to say that they will decrease their operational tempo to allow for greater coalescence of diplomatic options. Considering three things: (1) the current deadlock between the U.S. and France; (2) that Israel remains the spoiler for any initiatives anyway; and (3) that we have a weekend coming up and most of the United Nations will be too busy getting on with their leisure time; under these circumstances it makes no sense that the Israeli security cabinet would choose now as the time to allow for diplomatic developments. Therefore, with Stratfor's help, I am calling the Israeli government's bluff - this announcement is simply another attempt to gain greater initiative and rescue what little element of military surprise that they can manage under the circumstances.

Al-Mari Update: Local sources tell me that in the chaos of battles with Israeli troops outside al-Mari, a few Hizbullah fighters managed to infiltrate the town with the intention of hiding around or inside abandoned residents' houses. IDF observers apparently found out and called in precise air strikes, damaging some of the houses in the village. I am not sure as to the extent of the damage. My source says that so far there have been no deaths or injuries as a result, at least among the town's residents.

Also, Israeli troops are reportedly (local source) massed not just in Marjayoun, but also in the small town of Rachaiya al-Foukhar and the mountainous area around it. This area is just northeast of al-Mari but apparently not easily accessible from there directly. It is this particular occupation that I find interesting - a large presence here does not really serve the interest of cutting off supply lines; it's simply too far out of the way. However, heading north into the Bekaa looks like it would be fairly easy to do from there, as there are no towns that might obstruct the main road. We shall see soon enough.