Victory, Pyrrhic and Postmodern

Haaretz' Amir Oren defines victory as Israel must find it in this conflict:

In order to vanquish Nasrallah once and for all, the campaign must end in a manner similar to the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, not like the previous cease-fire that ended the first war in Iraq, in 1991. The invasion of Kuwait (the Iraqi equivalent to the abduction of the Israel Defense Forces soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser), which to Saddam's surprise raised the ire of the U.S. administration that he had previously scorned for its weakness, provoked a chain of events that weakened Saddam, but left him in place. Notwithstanding UN resolutions and the American power that enforced no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, he survived another dozen years and carried on mocking the world. Even more than Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton, who lost gubernatorial races but came back and won the presidency, Saddam was the comeback-kid of the Middle East.

Even as Amir Oren sees the conflict as Nasrallah-centric in a parallel manner to the U.S. Army's obsession with finding Saddam Hussein after its 2003 Iraq invasion, Stratfor notes that the IDF cannot look too far beyond the next ridgeline or mountain pass in this series of operations:

Israeli troops continued to engage Hezbollah fighters all along the Israeli-Lebanese border Aug. 7. Reports suggest Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has pushed into Dibel. Casualties have turned up in Bent Jbail again. Fighting in southern Lebanon has been slow and deliberate. If it continues as is, the southern thrust will only reach the Litani River in a drawn-out slog of
attrition warfare that will last -- at this pace -- another month at least.

And from an earlier analysis of how the IDF has been forced to operate in southern Lebanon's rocky terrain:

The war is going as quickly as it can under the circumstances. Hezbollah is clearly well armed, well motivated and, above all, well dug-in. The Israelis do not plan to take any more casualties than are needed. That means extremely slow going, as strong point after strong point is systematically attacked while the Israelis try to avoid tactical mistakes. That sort of careful, meticulous attack against competent forces takes a long time.

Hezbollah has the advantage of the defense. It also is configured that Hezbollah is, in any reasonable time frame, immune to Israel's favorite mobile tactics. It is not dependent on lines of supply or communication. This is also Hezbollah's disadvantage: It will not be re-supplied or reinforced, nor will it be able to move to the offensive. Israeli firepower and its concentration of force are too great for that. But it is clear that Hezbollah's bunkers are also its launch sites, or that the two are collocated. That means that the Israelis cannot simply ignore the bunkers. They must systematically and in detail destroy them, and do so with minimal exposure to Hezbollah fire.

That is a war that takes a long time. A great deal is happening, but all of it measured tactically and strategically in half-miles, not in dozens of miles. If the Israelis are going to eliminate the threat in southern Lebanon, it must be eliminated in very small steps, which is why the war appears to be at a standstill. But it is at a standstill only from the outside. Inside it is a slow, brutal meat-grinder, and it will take as long as it takes.

With relative concepts of victory being bandied about on all sides, it appears at least superficially that, were all the players involved - the hapless Arab League (a player!), the United Nations, Israel, the United States, et al.), Hizbullah would emerge claiming full-throated victory. In an immediate sense, this is how many will perceive their campaign, for Hizbullah will have succeeded in selling it in that manner.

But such privileges will have been expensive, and hardly permanent. Hizbullah will preside over a ruined Shiite community and once its unquestioned hegemonic territory in southern Lebanon now torn to shreds and pummeled to dust. Its weapons have been worn out, its warriors exhausted, its supply lines battered, and its international backers counting the cost of an extended war. Compounding any such difficulties will be the needs of Lebanon's own Shiites from the Beirut's southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, which will certainly overwhelm the skeletal remains of Hizbullah's social network. Many Shiites will continue to have to rely on the charity of other communities - such as Walid Jumblatt's Druse community in the Chouf Mountains (and some areas in Mount Lebanon), and even the somewhat less patient Maronites and Orthodox communities as well. Any social destabilization that results will have been the privilege of Nasrallah to bring about.

At the same time, Nasrallah has earned himself the legendary status as marked man, international man of mystery, that secret cleric extraordinaire completely consistent with Shiite legends. With Israel's security and intelligence establishment now tracking his every move, it will probably be a long time before we hear a live speech from Hassan Nasrallah, if we ever hear from him again. As Martin Kramer noted, he has been bin-Ladinized; he has become another Hidden Imam, sent into occultation and most likely rarely heard from again, and never again in public before hundreds of thousands of followers. His loyal community, unaccustomed to his sudden unavailability, most likely are not prepared for his absence; his safety and security will become a challenge and liability for which Hizbullah cannot be fully prepared right now.

And in the end, what exactly has Hizbullah won for its efforts? Since it is too soon to judge Hizbullah's "balance of terror" strategy as a successful deterrent to the Israeli threat, we can look at how this all began. Nasrallah began this war for all intents and purposes back in January when he announced that he would engage Israel in the south and seek hostages with which to exchange for the final few Lebanese prisoners still residing in Israel. In all the fighting and furor, with all the opportunity that waves of Israeli soldiers assaulting Hizbullah positions would provide, has Hizbullah taken a single additional prisoner? We would certainly know if they had, considering Hizbullah's own media initiatives. Also, Hizbullah has not succeeded in downing a single Israeli combat aircraft. Considering that Syria, Jordan, and Egypt all managed to take Israeli prisoners and shoot down Israeli aircraft in wars they clearly lost, where does this leave Hizbullah's war effort? Where are the true symptoms of victory aside from the postmodern assertion that it's somehow in the eye of the beholder?

Update: Fouad Saniora weak? Not so, says Abu Kais, seeing only feigned weakness masking a deliberate and intentional end-around play that may allow hin to tiptoe into Hizbullah-land. Not all would agree; read the whole thing.