Gambling on Golan
Much has been made about the current political position of Syria, with competing calls for American and European political powers either to talk or not to talk to Syria regarding the various sources of tension in the region. American policy has remained quite clear on the issue, and the opinion prevails that talks with Syria have been wholly unproductive in the past, and so they will probably be in the future. Syria's position remains to try to extort talks from the region's players, primarily using the brutalization of Lebanon as the primary source of instigation as well as context. With Syria cornered by American, French, and Arab pressure on all sides to cooperate more fully with the Brammertz investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and to fully implement UNR 1559 (i.e. ensure the disarmament of Hizbullah) on the other, Syria has been desperate to find avenues in which to maneuver.
Stratfor indicates that the Assad regime thinks that it has found the solution to all its problems – how to shoot its way back into the international community and try to influence Israel:
Syria has been denied involvement in the cease-fire agreement, and has been conspicuously excluded from the current talks to exchange prisoners of war between Hezbollah and Hamas on the one hand, and Israel on the other. As a result, the Syrians appear to be turning to their traditional method of handling foreign relations: explosives.
The chatter among pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon has included talk of a Syrian plan to activate a low-intensity conflict with Israel in the Golan Heights. Already there have been indications that Syria is preparing for such a confrontation. Sources in Lebanon report that a group of Iranian military experts belonging to the central training unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps recently arrived in Syria and is training Syrian army officers in operating advanced anti-armor
missiles. In addition, the Iranians are providing long-range missiles and are aiding Syria in constructing large numbers of bunkers and tunnels.
…
Syria is fully aware of its military impotence relative to Israel Defense Forces, but its plans are surprisingly ambitious. Sources claim that Syria intends to attack all of Israel's airfields in order to render its runways inoperable and neutralize the Israeli air force when things heat up in the Golan Heights. The Syrians may be gravely miscalculating that Israel's internal preoccupations and lack of an alternative to the al Assad regime will hold back Israel's military response. Israel has already been proclaimed the loser in the war against Hezbollah and has a pressing need to reassert itself militarily in the region. The Israelis continually count on Syrian miscalculations for opportunities to demonstrate their military prowess, and the Syrians could end up doing Israel a favor by inviting an Israeli military reprisal in the Golan Heights. Israel is not likely to allow Syria to dictate the level of intensity in the region.
Considering that Israel does not consider Hizbullah to be unfinished business, the chances of a military threat developing in the Golan Heights certainly represents a third front in its milieu of problems for its deterrence. Stratfor believes that Syria will not instigate a hot war using any such militia, the reason being that Assad understands (if we can assume that he is a rational man) that the other Arab regimes will not come to his assistance in any further military adventures. However, Assad seems to be able to count on Iran to provide whatever help he needs in attempting to combat Israel, and the result will probably be a low-level insurgency patterned on Hizbullah's actions between 2000 and 2006.
From the Israeli perspective, a threat in Golan effectively surrounds Israel with low-level paramilitary insurgent-style threats, most of which are sponsored by Iran. I'm not going to get into details about how all this relates to the current political environment, Iran's nuclear weapons, possible military actions against Iran and so on and so forth. Most of you have heard this all before. More than likely a threat from the Golan has not developed to fruition yet. However, Hizbullah has been moving quickly to reassert itself in southern Lebanon and re-consolidate its military capability in the Bekaa Valley (outside the mandate of the new UNIFIL force, of course). For now, the Lebanese front will remain the one that concerns Israel the most. Most Lebanese I speak with on a regular basis fear a re-ignited conflict with Israel. I fear that they are probably correct.
posted by Unfrozen Caveman Linguist @ 9:29 AM
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38 Comments:
I cant' say i'm convinced by the Stratfor ideas here.
There is no way Assad starts anything in the Golan. He knows better than to play that game. He's been lucky that Israel chose to respond on South Lebanon alone, for the Hezbollah actions. Any attempts at heating up the Golan will cause Israel to retaliate into Syria proper. And the Assad regime will not and cannot survive a war on Syrian soil. Period.
I also am not as convinced as everyone seems to be, that Lebanon is bound for another conflict. I happen to think that this entire mess fits rather neatly into a pattern going back to 2002 (check my entry here for some detail).
Syria is slowly being isolated, not only from relevance, but also from the upcoming peace initiative.
Tony Badran often claims that Syria's defection into the Iranian camp (away from the Arab world) is not only strategic, but permanent. I tend to agree, and I look at the Arab-Israeli-Iranian conflict as 3 pronged, with Syria firmly in the 3rd side here, and no longer part of the Arab fold. Don't be surprised if the Arab states, after making a show of trying to mollify Syria (and being rejected) end up going at it alone.
I agree with BV,
The Syrian regime has been spreading fake rumors concerning its intention and capabilities in order to bolst its reputation for decades.
BV - Having read your linked post, I see that you exclude entirely the smaller dynamic of southern Lebanon in your analysis - which is ultimately what will create a repeat of the Israel-Hizbullah conflict. HA has already re-infiltrated southern Lebanon and, along with the Lebanese army and a patchwork peace mission with a weak mandate, has accomplished a great deal toward creating a very complex situation on the ground there. It is in this complexity and ambiguity that Hizbullah thrives very well. There is nothing that Egypt, Jordan, or the gulf states can do to ameliorate the threat that Syria and Iran have created in southern Lebanon and thereby mollify Israel. In other words, there is little upon which to base a political solution to the problem, so any unilateral initiatives by and within the so-called Arab fold would not matter in this context.
In included the Golan issue just because Syria has been clutching at straws lately, and Iran seems to be perfectly willing to help them do that.
Caveman,
I think you're missing a bigger picture. I am not really excluding South Lebanon from my discourse, but I'm looking at things from a wider angle, so to speak.
Syria and Iran have had the ability to torpedo the peace process at will, using HA and the threat of its rockets. Ever since the failed Saudi initiative in 2002, the US and the moderate arabs have been basically weakening Syria's ability to be relevant. First 1559, then the withdrawal from Lebanon, and now the war on Hezbollah.
The Hezbollah card is still somewhate available to Syria, don't get me wrong. And ultimately only disarming the group will really make that go away, but I'm convinced that HA blew its wad (to use american slang) in this war. They are not as useful to Iran or Syria anymore. In my opinion, HA was a one shot dealio. There is no way the Lebanese Shia will accept more "adventures" out of Hezbollah, having seen what it can do to their homes. Hezbollah's entire "national defense" argument has already been proven to be BS..They have nothing but empty slogans left. And the further Lebanon drifts away from Syria, the more marginalized HA get.
That's not to say they don't still have the ability to sabotage peace talks, but we're not there yet. Give it time.
The point at which you concede that HA must be disarmed is where my discourse actually begins. This point is what ultimately drives the possibility of war with Israel yet again. We have been through this issue of who will disarm Hizbullah that I don't care to do it again, and the issue will not go away. Hizbullah is incapable of allowing themselves to be relegated as a secondary political movement and having a political agenda dicated to them, especially one that demands that they give up one of their sole sources of real strength vis a vis the Lebanese public. Also, a fully disenfranchised and desperate Syria makes HA's disarming even less likely, as I am sure you are aware. Finally, I sincerely doubt that Israel will tolerate even the slightest cross-border agitation from Hizbullah from here on out.
Ultimately, I see the current situation as merely a tepid continuation of the war - not a full all-out conflict, but merely a cooled-off version of what was still going on a couple weeks ago. I don't think that the United Nations has been able to affect a change in either side's fundamental standpoints, and I think that the government of Lebanon remains as weak as ever. This was a war that never concluded and whose founding tensions remain; therefore, it will begin again. It's just a matter of time.
Fair enough, Caveman.
Taking it from where your discourse starts: I think you might end up being right. But I also think there's a chance HA gets marginalized. Whether it likes it or not. And I don't particularly think the Lebanese government is as weak as you think. They currently have the upper hand on HA, and a UNIFIL force to back them up. We'll have to see where this goes from here.
Until the Lebanese government establishes clear rule of law, uncorruptible security forces (that means not influenced by sect, clan, or family issues, in case you are wondering), and an independent judiciary, the Lebanese government is exactly as weak as I think. The whole reason Lebanon is here today in this godawful situation is because it lacks (and has traditionally lacked) the three things I mentioned above.
The thing that I have grown very weary of hearing from Lebanese is that Lebanon's government, politics, international relations, and what-have-you are complicated and you have to understand their many, many nuances in order to be able to find a solution to Lebanon's problems. This is garbage. Lebanon's problems are so complicated because they are so layered, and they are so layered because not one of them has ever been solved properly.
Take security - the best and most efficient security environments are unilaterally imposed. The fewer the number of decision-makers, the fewer the distractions from the ultimate goal of keeping the streets safe and everyone happy as clams in their homes. One reason Hizbullah has bested the Lebanese government in this area is that it DOES possess such a security mindset and it has outmaneuvered the Lebanese government's attempts to provide that very thing (and often exposed evidence that the Lebanese government was less willing to provide it).
That said, you will not get security from the godawful combination of United Nations troops working alongside Lebanese army soldiers and interior ministry troops. Who will ultimately be in charge? There will be a very complicated separation of duties and everyone will always be stepping on each other's toes. Add Hizbullah's own security services to the mix, and it just gets plain ridiculous. The end result is no security, except what Hizbullah will be able to provide for their own people in southern Lebanon, and the Lebanese government will stand even more discredited and pathetic-looking.
So, as you can tell, I don't see how you can entertain the notion that the Lebanese government has any kind upper hand on Hizbullah. It's not that I don't see the same political "big picture" as you, it's just that I think the ground-level situation will ultimately trump any perceived improvements made on that front. And the Lebanese government will have ushered in all those problems simply by being so weak.
Fair enough, again.
You're preaching to the choir when it comes to the whole idea of sectarian/familial/whatever loyalties. That is and has always been the root of all the internal lebanese problem.
There is no denying that at all.
I think you and I differ on whether the on-the-ground situation will trouble the political regional plan. We shall see, I guess.
I have seen what both failed and successful peacekeeping looks like from the ground-level (as observer and participant). What bothers me is that Lebanese are putting a lot of stock in the success of this new UNIFIL mission, although it is in every possible way primed to fail its most important mission - keeping an eye on Hizbullah. Once Israeli troops leave, it will be the blind leading the blind out there, and HA will take advantage of every missed step. Just watch.
Caveman,
The Syrians must be in an incredibly desperate situation if they resort to directly confronting Israel.
The Syrians still have the Palestinian card to play. This is becoming more difficult because of the antagonistic relationships Syria and Hamas have created with Jordan and Egypt, but the Palestinians are still a major source of chaos.
I don't think Assad is yet in a situation in which he will completely leverage his entire power for the sake of international relevance. But once the Brammertz Report comes out, all bets are off.
Worst case scenario:
Iran is boxed in on the nuclear issue.
Syria is boxed in by Brammertz.
Hezbollah is boxed in by an invigorated Lebanese government and UNIFIL.
Hamas is boxed in by Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Abu Mazen.
Then comes the coordinated attack.
Charles,
Exactly. That's what I am driving at. There's a pattern there that's leading towards Iran and Syria being made irrelevant.
Obviously, they won't roll over and die, so when we get to that point you describe, all bets will be off.
From the Israeli perspective, a threat in Golan effectively surrounds Israel with low-level paramilitary insurgent-style threats, most of which are sponsored by Iran.
------
To imitate Hezbollah's or Hamas' tactics Syria should pretend to be a state within a state , or a state without a state. In fact playing such a game against Israel is risky precisely because Syria may end up becoming one of these.
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Syria already behaved this way regarding Iraq. I discussed Syria's tactic and its inevitable failure here (early last year), but more in a context of Sunni regional involvement in the wake of the Hariri assassination. I also mentioned what it means for the U.S. or Israel to conduct "secret negotiations" with insurgents or terrorist groups:
"[T]he U.S. can certainly take advantage of the inherent weakenesses of this insurgency - so what does one do with an enemy that does not talk much with each other and yet watches satellite TV and reads the world's newspapers? Start a rumor, that's what. Certainly, if the U.S. were conducting secret negotiations with the intent of creating a tactical advantage for itself, it would never share that information with the media. If it were trying to threaten the insurgents, though - and thereby divide them against each other - then it may well be the best strategy available. For the U.S.' strategy to be effective it need not necessarily be true that it is negotiating with the insurgents, but only that the insurgents believe that some of their numbers are indeed selling out. If they believe that they are being divided against each other, it could sow confusion in their ranks, and all the implications thereof - such as purges within their ranks, other insurgents jumping ship, etc. So this is where we come back to Syria - that Syria could have been fanning the flames of an insurgency that now may become divided against itself is probably the worst of all possible situations, because they will be forced to reckon with a monster they helped create but now cannot control. And the specter of possible Saudi involvement? Don't even ask."
So far Syria's response has been to sow MORE mayhem, not less, but it is clear that the Assad regime now is past the point of no return. They are so dependent on the nut-jobs of the world - Iran, armed proto-states, and jihadist groups - to prosecute their foreign policy for them that the real Baathist state has become quite meaningless as an international entity.
Short version: Syria already is one of those, and was well on its way to becoming one of those even last year.
I mean in the sense Israel can make Syria one of these
What i like about your posts caveman and that they are always exhuberant with the most optimistic scenarios.
The thing is that for some reason when i look around the region it looks absolutely hopeless. I think Tom and Jerry is the only positive thing we got here. But given that, as it was discovered recently, both of them are also arabs, i am not really banking on this
Lets say, this is my question to you, caveman. Point me to something to keep myself optimistic.
Unfrozen Caveman Linguist said...
Syria already behaved this way regarding Iraq
It most probably would nt work in case of Israel. Especially if we get here a right wing government which may actually happen in the end
Something optimistic: The University of North Carolina will have the number one men's basketball team this winter. I am very optimistic about that.
Oh, you mean the "region?" As the renowned American wordsmith Flavor Flav said back in the day, I ain't got nothin' for ya, man.
I knew that you would say something like this.
Lets say that if Syria tries to play the trick of low scale guerilla warfare on Israel, the chances that it would recieve a full scale war in responce are more than 50/50. This is probably the most optimistic thing that i can say right now about the region
I can put a positive spin for ya :)
I agree with Caveman's analysis about Syria. If you take that to its logical conclusion: The Syrian state, on its continuing path to irrelevance, will be soon headed to "regime change". And they probably won't have anyone to blame but themselves.
This point of no return that Caveman points out happens to lead to regime change, inevitably.
That's a good thing. Down the line.
B.V.
The thing is that in the context of Syria 'regime change' invokes for me connotations of Iraq or the ayatollas' revolution in Iran. But i agree that in our situations we should use everything under our hand to find some positivity.
Believe it or not, that is how I see the inevitable outcome. The problem is that I cannot find an excuse for optimism without a timeline or a pretext for determining one. Without that, any discussion about the limitations of Syria's or Iran's positions vis a vis the Sunni Arab states, Lebanon, the international community, or anything else is just fluffy speech. None of this changes my assessment that the ground-level situation in southern Lebanon is primed for deterioration, easily within the next year. Please don't argue strengthened UNIFIL or reinvigorated Lebanese government again, for I simply cannot rationally buy into these ideas as relevant on the ground. The United Nations' efforts will collapse for the same reason that they usually do. Those will be - overly ambitious mission, top-heavy command structure, insufficient liaison activity between member nations' armies, poor command and control, and ridiculously complicated rules of engagement. And you should know by now the capacity of the Lebanese government to disappoint at the most crucial moments.
But hey - if regime change excites you that much, go with it. While you're at it, batten down the hatches and prepare for the worst. Emigrating might be a good idea as well. I have seen that many Lebanese have already done this or are in the process of doing so. I am not exactly unhappy that the Syrian regime will eventually get what it deserves, but it's gonna come at a hefty price.
Actually i think that the ceasefire would hold but only for the reason that Nasrallah would stick to it. Of course what Israel may do is another thing. I certianly can imagine that at some point they may try to assasinate Nasrallah and restart the mess.
I remember that even under Oslo they never hesitated to carry out assasinations if it was about somebody who was really marked, like 'muhandis' for example. So its possible.
I can t imagine in details regime change in Syria but the impression is that whatever happens in the region, nothing good eventually comes out of it
UnCL,
chatter among pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon...has included talk of-
a Syrian plan to activate a low-intensity conflict with Israel in the Golan Heights
Uh. Yeah. Doesn't this "intel" sounds like talk from some shawarma stand vendor? - let's call him Ghazi - who just returned from visiting his cousin Bukhari in Syria. Ghazi's a Hizbollah supporter who knows neither his country or his movement won't dare particpate in any more acts of "adventurism" against Iss-rah-eeel - at least any time soon, and especially upon returning to see all the utter devestation that surrounds him in his old 'hood. So what now? He dreams a little dream and to make himself feel better suggests now that Syria is going to "continue the fight" for him in the Golan- to protect his honor, and of course, his lands.
Keep talking Ghazi- and that'll be lamb shawarma for me, with salad, extra sauce. shukr'n!
Unless the article I read a couple months ago in Elaph was written by your Ghazi abu Lahme, then I would say there is more to it than that. But not much more.
I dunno man, is it just me or does this whole analysis just wreaks of psy-ops warfare?
Don't get me wrong-It's not as if the idea of Syria instigating assassinations or kidnappings, taking money or orders from Iran is out of the realm of possibilities...I read this article and think what's in it for Syria if they were to do as Stratfor is suggesting and...does Syria really want their asses kicked that hard? Because I doubt very much Israel will employ as much restraint next go 'round. and yes, for those who can't believe Israel used restraint in the conflict w/ Hizbollah - get a clue.
"HA has already re-infiltrated southern Lebanon and, along with the Lebanese army and a patchwork peace mission with a weak mandate, has accomplished a great deal toward creating a very complex situation on the ground there."
Of course, this was to be expected. However, is re-infiltration the same thing as actually controlling territory, as HA did before the war? Also, if anyone can cite credible links describing the bunker system the Israelis uncovered I'd appreciate it. This has been very ignored in the MSM. But I admit I don't pay much attention to the MSM.
"None of this changes my assessment that the ground-level situation in southern Lebanon is primed for deterioration, easily within the next year. Please don't argue strengthened UNIFIL or reinvigorated Lebanese government again, for I simply cannot rationally buy into these ideas as relevant on the ground."
Well, despite my attempts to play devil's advocate, I'd agree.
And there's a side of me that would love to believe the schwarma-stand gossip about Bashar trying to bomb the Israeli airfields, because this is a war that the Israelis could really win. But...who is the alternative in Syria? Got anyone better? Look at Iraq. With the Arab world the choices strike me as "Bad" or "Worse." You cannot undo generations of extremist inculcation with regime change.
With respect to the nuances of the regime-change negatives, I don't necessarily find Iraq and Syria to be in comparable situations. The key issue here is Iran. We can assume that a non-Alawite Syria would undoubtedly express a predominantly Sunni character, for obvious reasons. What Assad wants everyone to believe is that a Sunni Syria is automatically a Terrorist Hotbed Syria. However, considering the amount of leeway that the U.S. has given Saudi Arabia in influencing the Syrian regime, it appears that it has tacitly become U.S. policy not to care if Syria ends up with a non-secular regime, as long as Iran's influence has been decreased or eliminated. This thinking that Assad can be "won over" or "convinced" or even "bought" into relinquishing his ties with Iran is nonsense. We all know that Assad cannot be trusted to speak the truth to an international audience and come through on promises to same. Attempting to lessen Iran's influence by dealing strategically with Assad is a waste of time, when one knows full well that allowing Syria's majority to come into power would accomplish the same thing more effectively and permanently. It now appears that the U.S. administration is willing to take the risk.
What kind of effect would this have on Iraq? Well, we cannot tell yet, but since Sunnis are a minority in Iraq (vs. the Shi'a of course), we have to consider Iraq to be more predisposed toward falling into Iran's sphere of influence anyway. In this context, a Sunni-dominated Syria heavily influenced politically by the moderate Arab states can have the long-term effect of limiting Iranian expansion and probably even decreasing its influence in Lebanon. In other words, a balance of power, so to speak.
As you describe it, regime change in Syria would make the situation marginally better. But only marginally. And only in the short term. The long term issues of the Middle East look to me utterly insoluble. The real issue is Islam. My sympathies are with the Christians of Lebanon. I see no future for them.
Better reconsider that statement before Assad decides that he has yet another pretext to remain in office - "to protect the Christians." I am sure the last Byzantine emperor muttered something similar as he watched Constantinople's defenses crumble under Ottoman attack. On and on it goes. All I can say is that we know now how things ultimately ended up for the Ottomans. I don't see Lebanon's Christians going anywhere.
"I don't see Lebanon's Christians going anywhere."
Really? I thought that their emigration rate is high, and that they are now no more than 25% of a country they once dominated. If that much--there hasn't been an honest census in how long?
If you trust the reliability of anecdotal evidence, that is. I don't. The emigration rate of Lebanese is very high all-around, and there's no one at the airport checking the sectarian breakdown of those who are leaving. Ask any Lebanese - Shi'a, Sunni, Christian, or Druze - what they will do if the opportunity to leave presents itself. That said, I didn't exactly count heads while I lived in Lebanon, but I found no evidence of this Christian shortage that so many are talking about. There are still enough there to surround yourself with them and never see any Muslims.
just that you know: this is no Mujo & Haso
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