Strategic Desperation

Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists have attempted to attack the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, according to various reports. Al-Nahar reports that the attack consisted of only three assailants, one of whom drove a vehicle packed full of explosives, and Syrian security forces killed all three.

Do not discount the timing of this attack. Syrian security services still have a tight lock on what happens in Damascus; there are no shadowy groups that operate below the government's radar or without the government's consent. Furthermore, the Assad regime has promoted the use of purported random acts of violence as part of its agenda to increase its power over Lebanon for a long time now. This strategy backfired in October 2004 and in February 2005, but these setbacks did not deter the Assad regime from continuing to use terrorism and assassinations to try to reverse the ever-increasing gap between itself and Lebanon through extorsion and blatant threats.

Now the Assad regime's desperation for "dialogue" has hit a new mark. This attack was undoubtedly intended to demonstrate to the United States (and Europe, for that matter) what awaits its strategy of isolating Syria. Considering the increasingly vitriolic and accusatory rhetoric emanating from Hizbullah lately, this attack appears to contain a message to those Lebanese who support the March 14 coalition as well.

Update: See Mustapha's ironic take on this event here.

Update 2: From Stratfor's updated analysis:

Not only were the IEDs poorly constructed -- meaning they probably lacked sufficient power to even breach the embassy compound's perimeter wall, let alone damage the interior of the compound -- the attacking force also was completely inadequate for hitting a hard target such as the embassy. The compound is surrounded by Syrian security forces, and guarded on the inside by U.S. Marines. Although small details suggest the embassy was the target, it is hard to believe such an attack would have been so botched.

An analysis of the preliminary details of the attack suggests the Syrian response was swift and aggressive. Plainclothes Syrian security officers appear to have engaged the attackers before they were able to position themselves for the attack. As the shooting began, some of the attackers reportedly ran into a nearby building and continued firing from there. At least two of the attackers reportedly were seen running toward the embassy, firing automatic rifles and throwing at least one grenade. The fighting lasted for 15 minutes to about half an hour, according to different witnesses.

Consider also:

The U.S. Embassy is located in Damascus' Rawda district, an area that also houses many other foreign embassies and Syrian government buildings, as well as palaces used by Syrian President Bashar al Assad. One of these palaces is within 980 feet of the U.S. Embassy, which is partly the reason for the tight security in the area. Because of the number of high-value targets in the area, however, only a serious investigation into the attack would reveal the true target -- and U.S. investigators probably are not going to be allowed close to this one.

And the fact that:

Due to the tension between Washington and Damascus, the degree of Syrian surveillance around the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is equal to that which was in place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War. In addition to the approximately 30 Syrian guards posted around the embassy on any given day, the compound is under constant and heavy surveillance by Syrian intelligence and security forces. This surveillance begins several blocks out, and all locals in the vicinity are watched by the Syrians as possible U.S. intelligence sources. Anyone acting suspiciously near the embassy immediately attracts the attention of Syrian security forces.

Stratfor blames a lack of insurgent proficiency for the failure of this attack to cause harm to embassy personnel or property. More pertinent than the failure of the terrorist mission is the timing of its occurrence at all. At this time a weakened Hizbullah agitates in Lebanon to attempt to cause the Saniora government to fall. Meanwhile, a cornered Assad attempts to make last-ditch maneuvers to avoid the inertia of the Hariri murder investigation. Save for Iran, to whom Assad has committed himself wholeheartedly, he has no friends left in the internati0nal community; domestically, he has committed himself to an unprecedented religion-based cultural revival in an attempt to buy off the religious interests that may otherwise try to compete with him; he has cultivated terror as a crop for export, and he has established Lebanon as its primary destination (now that Iraq has made the trade in cross-border jihad more risky than the payoff can warrant). At the same time, Assad knows full well that another misadventure in southern Lebanon involving Hizbullah may cost him the remainder of Hizbullah's weapons and his own standing army. It appears that Assad, having squandered his diplomatic options on avoiding the prying fingers of the Hariri murder investigation, spent his military ones on Hizbullah's recent fireworks display. Assad now triumphantly possesses only terror as his sole source of diplomatic, geopolitical, or even military initiative. I find it very curious indeed that Assad's bungling of his own foreign affairs may have inadvertently and ironically created what all dictators crave - an enviable level of efficiency.